NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON
PEACE,
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
DEMOCRACY BUILDING...
TEN YEARS AFTER THE PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT
BY
Nady Tan

Secretary General of the Royal Government

Phnom Penh, 21-23 October 2001

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Cambodia and her people who have suffered so much, loss of human life and untold sufferings in the past, deserve the support of the international community to complete the badly needed process of national reconciliation and reconstruction.

The search for a political settlement in the Cambodian conflict process has brought the first International Conference on Cambodia to convene in the summer of 1989 in Paris, France. This first conference, however, was adjourned without the final result.

Two years later, the International Conference in Paris on Cambodia was reconvened for a second time, and finally produced the successful completion of a comprehensive political settlement agreement.

This presentation is to discuss about the United Nation Peace Agreement and its implications that will be covering two different issues, as follows:

    1. The summary of the U.N Peace Agreement
    2. The potential problems of the implementation of this Peace Agreement

The UN Peace Agreement

The Second International Conference in Paris on Cambodia was reconvened for 3 days. Twenty countries participated in that conference. Those are: Australia, Brunei; Cambodia (represented by 12 members of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, of which His Royal Highness Samdech Preach Norodom Sihanouk is the President); Canada, People's Republic of China; France; India; Indonesia; Japan; Laos; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Soviet Union; Great Britain; United States of America; Vietnam and two non-aligned countries represented by Zimbabwe and Yugoslavia.

October 21,1 1991 was reserved for coordinating committee meeting.

October 22, 1991 was to provide for a private consultation.

October 23, 1991 was the signing ceremony day.

Four documents were unanimously adopted by the Coordinating Committee

on October 21, 199 1:

    1. Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict.
    2. Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia.
    3. Declaration of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.
    4. Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia.

The documents consist of.

1. 9 Parts

2. 32 Articles

3. 5 Annexes

PART I. Arrangements during the transitional period

a. Transitional period. The transitional period shall commence with the entry into force (date of signature, October 23, 1991) of this Agreement and terminating when the constituent assembly elected through FREE and FAIR elections, organized and certified by the United Nations, has approved the constitution (3 months grace period) and transformed itself into a legislative assembly, and thereafter a new government has been created.

b. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. The United Nations Security Council (PERM 5) shall establish a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) with civilian and military components under the direct responsibility of the Secretary General of the United Nations. For this purpose, the Secretary General shall designate a Special Representative to act on his behalf.

c. Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC). The Supreme National Council is the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the Sovereignty, Independence and Unity of Cambodia are enshrined.

Composition. The SNC should be composed of twelve members, including the President.

All decisions shall be made by a consensus among the members of the

Supreme National Council. If there is no consensus despite every endeavor of its President, His Royal Highness Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk, the President will be entitled to make the decision on what advice to offer to UNTAC, taking "y into account the views expressed in the SNC.

If His Royal Highness Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk, President of the SNC, is not, for whatever reason, in a position to make such a decision, His power of decision will transfer to the Secretary General's Special Representative.

d. Withdrawal of Foreign Forces and its Verification

The U.N has a mandate to control and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia.

c. Cease-fire and Cessation of Outside Military Assistance

The UN will observe, control, verify the TRUCE and the cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian parties.

Military Arrangements

70% of each party's forces will be demobilized. The remaining 30% will be demobilized before or shortly after the election or will be decided by the newly elected government.

PART II. Elections

UNTAG will organize and conduct the election referred to in Part 11 of the Agreement in accordance with Annex 3. The election shall be conducted

under the FREE AND FAIR environment.

PART III. Provision for human rights

PART IV. International Guarantee

PART V. Refugees and Displaced Persons

PART VI. Release of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees

PART VII. Principles for New Constitution for Cambodia

According to the Paris Agreement, Part VII stipulates very clearly:

PART VIII. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

PART IX. Final Provision

The Potential Problems on the Implementation of the U N Peace

Agreement

As we all probably know, the Peace Agreement which was signed in Paris on this last October 23, 1991 in Paris, was the biggest and costliest ever for the United Nations to try to bring peace to Cambodia. Even though the Agreement was called a Comprehensive Plan, there are still many detailed issues which need to be discussed.

In order to efficiently implement this Comprehensive Plan, UNTAC should have, at least, seven working groups. Those are: the military group, the civil administration group, the electoral group, the police group, the human rights group, the repatriation and the rehabilitation groups.

Therefore, at that time, it has been anticipated that there were many complex and potential problems can occur throughout the implementation phase of this

immense task. How many was not known; however, a few potential problems are as follows:

1. Financial. The total cost of the UN operation in Cambodia might be increased to a total annual cost of 3 billion US dollars, because the UN plans to deploy a force of 22,000 strong to implement the plan. This force, however, is the most ambitious and the most expensive in UN history. Previously, the largest number of UN troops deployed to Congo in 1960, was only 20,000 men Strong.

On February 14, 1992, the UN General Assembly approved an emergency request from the Secretary General for an advance of 200 million dollars to be taken away from an emergency fund.

On February 19, 1992, the Security Council of the United Nations approved the budget which has been initially proposed at 1.9 billion dollars for 18 months. The 15 council member unanimously directed the Secretary General to dispatch 15,900 military personnel to Cambodia as soon as possible.

Whether the cost of this plan is 1.9 billion, or 3 billion, or perhaps 4.5 billion dollars, the question is: Where is the money coming from? The cost was based mainly on the country donors, but yet, at that time Cambodia had to compete with El Salvador and Yugoslavia, in both of which rich country donors have more direct interests.

Another issue which will have a direct impact upon the financial situation is the delay in sending personnel and material to CAMBODIA. The longer the process is delayed, the more the cost will increase.

2. Elections. The big issue regarding elections, about which the UN plan did not elaborate in detail,, is the right to vote for those Cambodians who live abroad, such as in the United States, Canada, France, etc.

If based on the Agreement, it was spelled out very clearly that "Cambodian refugees and displaced persons will have the same rights, freedoms and opportunities to take part in the electoral process," including the right to vote.

The question was the Cambodians who lived abroad, considered as refugees or displaced persons? In my humble opinion, they were either (if not all, but the majority) permanent residents or citizens of the country they live in. If so, they probably have no right to vote.

This concern was raised and discussed at the Supreme National Council of Cambodia meeting in Pattaya, Thailand, on June 24-25, 1991. One of the voice had strongly argued and rejected the right to vote for those Cambodians who lived abroad. The discussion concerning this matter was still on the agenda of the SNC.

Again, one of the idea was firm that those Cambodians who live abroad and who are willing to vote, have to be residents of Cambodia and stay permanently inside Cambodia for at least one year before the election. Another question is if they were allowed to vote in the country where they lived, how would they do this?

Another issue related to the election is in regard to the membership of each political party In paragraph 5 of Annex 3, the Agreement says, "Political parties may be formed by any group of five thousand registered voters." Unfortunately, the document did not specify whether those ] ; "registered voters" shall be the Cambodians who lived inside or outside Cambodia at all. If the rules require the residence 'm Cambodia, this will put the political party formed on foreign soil in a very difficult situation of finding their membership. These difficulties come from two reasons. One is the time line. According to the Annex 1, Section D, paragraph 5 of the Agreement, it says, as follows:

The timetable for the various phases of the electoral process will be determined by UNTAC, in consultation with the SNC as provided in paragraph 2 of this section. The duration of the electoral process will not exceed nine months from the commencement of voter registration.

NOT TO EXCEED NINE MONTHS. Is it enough time? it was afraid the time line would not be more than FIVE MONTHS-due to the huge task of the U N in the election process. Last, but not least, the duration of the campaign period could be six to eight weeks (Security Council - United Nations S/23613, 19 February, 1992, Page 8). Does the new political party have enough time to make the Cambodians inside Cambodia know of its existence?

 

Another reason is that every political party has to register with UNTAC. "All political parties must be formally registered by UNTAC in order to participate in the elections."

Registration with LINTAC can be done, if those political parties meet with all the criteria. However, what if the SNC does not want to include the other newly formed parties? As we all know, the SNC operates under the consensus rule; if one of the four parties in the SNC rejects the inclusion -- there will be no consensus. Then what would it be happened ?

Fortunately, all of those issues concerning election have been resulted in the very positive way due to the understanding of the SNC under the August Leadership of Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk and the efforts of UNTAC under the chairmanship of his Excellency Yasushi Akashi.

Refugees and Displaced Persons

  1. According to the Agreement, the repatriation of those 350,000 displaced persons who lived in the camps along the Thai-Cambodian border, must be made on a voluntary basis.
  2. The question was what about those who were not voluntarily willing to return; does the international community have any contingency plan to resettle them somewhere else?

  3. The Agreement did not elaborate on those Cambodians who were displaced within the country. It is noticed that Cambodians all over Cambodia have been displaced at least three times already. The first time was during the Khmer Rouge regime. The second was during the Vietnamese invasion and occupation. The third time, however, was because of the war between the resistance and the Vietnamese occupiers and because of economic reasons.
  4. By repatriating those displaced persons from the border camps, the Agreement did not have any protection plan with regard to the secondary migration issue at all.

In this regard, we should all know that Cambodians are not immigrants. They have left their homeland, their hometown because, to them, it was a question of no other choice. Now they are able to return home, but yet they were resettled in a different place. Referring to the Cambodian culture, there was no hope that we can keep those Cambodians at the place where the United Nations resettled them. Therefore, they shall be moving back to their hometown or village. Then the problems will begin. Two scenarios can happen:

  1. When they find out that the new settlers are also Cambodians, compromise solutions might be able to be reached.
  2. But what if they find out that the new settlers are Vietnamese? We all should expect that another war might possibly occur.

All of the above mentioned issues have not been resolved as yet. Everyone strongly hoped that the SNC, with the support of the United Nations under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, will obtain solutions which will be fair and for the best interest of all Cambodians.

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

For the past two decades, Cambodia has been the site of chronic war, destruction, and unspeakable human suffering; and a source of continuing tension, turmoil, and division for all of Southeast Asia. It has also been a place of conflicts and rivalries, where the major powers fully demonstrated with abandon their strength and influence. Enduring this uirmoil, Cambodia and her people are united once again. This reunification is one of the major components that facilitated the progress to reach the final stages of the Peace Agreement.

As a Cambodian, 1 feel very fortunate to be among participants of the International Conference in Paris on Cambodia and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and to have been a witness to the unremitting efforts of the international community to assist in bringing this conflict to an end.

Before closing, 1 wish to make an appeal, if 1 may, to all Cambodians --that we should stand together to work hand-in-hand to rebuild our society and to reconstruct our beloved Cambodia.

The worst violations of human rights and mass killings of the recent past, committed by the previous regime in Cambodia, were not uniquely caused by the change of ideology from capitalism to communism. However, that change also included jealousy, hatred, and revenge, which is why more than two million Cambodian lives have been lost.

 

In the near future, if Khmers continue to build up, in their minds and hearts and souls, jealousy, hate, mistrust and revenge, how many more million Cambodians will we want to sacrifice?

We, therefore, must enjoy and keep up the Birth of our Second Kingdom, and provide our best support to our current government and to work towards Peace. National Reconciliation and Development of our Country.

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Cambodia and the fate of the Cambodians are in your hands. It is up to all of you.

To conclude this emotional presentation, 1 profoundly wish and hope that Peace and Prosperity in Cambodia will result in a harmonious cooperation that works for the Unity, Progress, Prosperity and Happiness of all.

Thank you,

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